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THE COSTS OF COMPLEXITYt 
Stephen B. Burbank* 
COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED 
CIVIL PROCEDURE. By Richard L. Marcus and Edward F. Sherman. 
St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1985. Pp. xxxvii, 846. $32.95. 
"Complex litigation" means different things to different people; the 
term captures a multitude of sins. Not even those charged with re-
sponsibility to devise procedures for complex cases in the federal 
courts have essayed a definition worthy of the name. 1 Law professors 
need not be lexicographers in putting together materials for course 
study, although providing definition to an area of law represents per-
haps the highest form of that enterprise as scholarship. When law 
professors do not pursue this daunting task, and few do,2 the enter-
prise is most worthwhile if its product permits others to begin to im-
pose intellectual discipline on the area, or field, that the authors have 
marked as worthy of discrete attention. 
It is no criticism of Complex Litigation that the authors have 
neither posited a definition of the problems their materials document 
nor imposed an intellectual framework within which to consider those 
materials. The book breaks new ground, and the attempt would have 
been premature. It is enough that the authors have conducted a thor-
ough survey, identified faults in the terrain, and by mapping those 
faults, provided a sound basis for development. Litigation is intensely 
practical business, and the authors' choice of identifying practical 
problems and recurrent patterns of response may be the best way to 
approach - and is certainly necessary to discipline - theories of 
complex litigation. Moreover, the authors are also concerned about 
the practical needs of lawyers, 3 and in course materials designed to 
t Copyright© 1987 by Stephen B. Burbank. 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, Harvard University. 
-Ed. 
1. Indeed, nobody has devised a litmus test by which one may decide whether a given 
case is properly labelled complex. The Manual for Complex Litigation itself does not even 
attempt to define complex litigation. Instead, in section 0.22 it simply describes types of 
"potentially complex cases," focusing on either the type of claim made ... or the procedural 
characteristics of the case. 
P. 2. 
2. But see, e.g., A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1965). 
3. See, e.g., p. 1. See also R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, TEACHERS MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE I (1985) [hereinafter 
TEACHERS MANUAL]. This manual is extraordinarily well done. For one hesitant to embark on 
a new course, particularly a course treating difficult material, it can serve as both a road map and 
1463 
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meet those needs, the prematurity of a theory of complex litigation 
would probably have been a small point at which to stick. Of course, 
an unremittingly practical perspective would not be interesting to 
many law professors and law students, and it would ill equip either to 
change the status quo. But that is not a problem here;4 Complex Liti-
gation is a rich repository of material for discussion and debate about 
procedure, courts, and law.5 
A great advantage in a course on complex litigation is precisely 
that the phenomenon as presently conceived is so various that it per-
mits unusual freedom in the choice of materials for study. In addition, 
many of the practical procedural problems of current interest emerged 
in, or may be identified primarily with, litigation that for one reason or 
another is deemed complex. 6 If, therefore, the authors of a casebook 
on complex litigation have done their job well, at the end of the course 
students should have a good sense of where the action is in American 
civil procedure today. 
The perception of practical problems and the proposals to solve 
them have prompted reconsideration of the premises of modem Amer-
ican civil procedure. 7 Reconsideration has just begun, and it is a par-
ticularly difficult business. So long as the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure seemed to work well in the federal courts and attracted em-
ulation in the states, there was little attention devoted to their basic 
premises. 8 More generally, academics interested in theory have 
tended to neglect litigation procedure.9 Indeed, as those who have suf-
fered a diet of personal jurisdiction and federalism in a basic course in 
civil procedure know too well, many teachers have not been interested 
in the Federal Rules and in the phases of a lawsuit they address. We 
have been teaching what we were taught. If the authors of a casebook 
on complex litigation have done their job well, neither teacher nor stu-
dent should be able to escape consideration of the premises of modem 
procedure. 
a security blanket. Some of the material in the manual, however, should be in the book. See note 
119 infra. 
4. See p. xv (A course in advanced civil procedure presents "challenging theoretical issues at 
the cutting edge of modern procedural innovation."). 
5. I argue below that, notwithstanding its strengths, the book would be improved by greater 
attention to modes of dispute resolution other than litigation. See text accompanying notes 114-
15 infra. 
6. See, e.g., text following note 30 infra (discovery). 
7. See, e.g., Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
8. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1186 (1982). 
9. See G. HAZARD, JR., RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 63 (1963) ("With but few excep-
tions, the product of procedural scholarship in the last 25 years is conspicuously bare of any 
serious attention to what might be called the philosophy of procedure."). See also Graham, The 
Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism (Book Review), 61 TEXAS L. REV. 929, 94648 (1983). 
Happily, in recent years there has been more interest in theories of procedure. See, e.g., text 
accompanying notes 17-21 infra. 
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A course in complex litigation thus has significant potential. There 
are, however, risks. One is a result of the traditional first-year curricu-
lum, as described above. The authors of materials on complex litiga-
tion must assume that students have basic grounding in many of the 
areas that are covered, and that assumption will often prove false. As 
to some matters, such as class actions (pp. 233-498), any problem is 
likely to be minor, because those matters are central to the study of 
complex litigation, with the result that one might as well start from 
scratch. As to other topics, such as subject matter jurisdiction and 
discovery, there may be a more serious problem, and teachers may 
have to take remedial action. 10 
A course in complex litigation is an imperfect vehicle for consider-
ing procedural reform. Recent amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure have been the subject of criticism on the ground that 
they provided responses to problems arising chiefly or exclusively in 
complex cases.11 But if there has been distortion, complex litigation 
may not be the culprit. Rather, the problem may be that today's re-
formers remain transfixed by the vision of uniform, trans-substantive 
procedure that animated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 12 
Whatever the cause, the fact that complex litigation has brought to 
light serious problems may make us less critical than we ought to be 
about the effects of proposed reforms in other types of cases. 
Although definitional agnosticism is understandable, a risk in tak-
ing the shotgun approach to complex litigation, whether in a course or 
in a law reform effort, is that by focusing on particular problems 
thought to be characteristic of complex litigation one may neglect rela-
_tionships among the problems discretely identified. Worse, in seeking 
solutions for a problem in focus, one may inadvertently exacerbate 
other problems.13 
The authors of Complex Litigation have done their job well, en-
abling teachers to realize the advantages of a course on complex litiga-
tion with due attention to its risks. In this essay I will explore some of 
the themes that I have chosen to pursue with the authors' help, indi-
10. On subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., pp. 63-79 ("Incidental Jurisdiction for Joinder of 
Necessary Parties"), pp. 88-108 (incidental jurisdiction and sovereign immunity), and pp. 121-31 
(incidental jurisdiction and intervention). On discovery, see pp. 499-592. Because of the authors' 
understandable desire to cast their net wide, students who have not taken a course in federal 
courts may feel uneasy. See, e.g., pp. 79-108 ("Joinder Problems Involving Governmental Enti-
ties"), pp. 108-20 ("Justiciability Issues in Joinder of Parties"), and pp. 150-67 (abstention). 
11. See, e.g., Sherman, Restructuring the Trial Process in the Age of Complex Litigation 
(Book Review), 63 TEXAS L. REV. 721, 744-45 (1984); Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court 
Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 
813 (1981); text following note 30 infra. 
12. See text accompanying notes 58-71 infra. As indicated there, the model of trans-substan-
tive procedure may be more illusion than reality as the Federal Rules become charters for ad hoc 
decisionmaking. 
13. See text accompanying notes 103-13 infra. 
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eating a few matters of interpretation or emphasis on which I disagree 
with them, and literature that I have found useful in supplementation 
of their work. Other teachers will have different interests and accord-
ingly will perceive different strengths and weaknesses. 14 A great 
strength of Complex Litigation is that it accommodates a broad range 
of pedagogical agendas. 
I. PROCEDURAL PREMISES AND PROCESS VALUES 
One cannot usefully evaluate a procedural system, let alone use-
fully participate in debate about procedural reform, without some no-
tion of the values that the system serves or that it ought to serve. 
When the subject is litigation procedure, it may be possible for stu-
dents to derive such values from a study of cases. But, if it is true that 
little attention has been paid to procedural premises, that is a treacher-
ous strategy.15 . The authors of Complex Litigation evidently recog-
nized the problem; indeed, they apologize for the theoretical cast of 
their opening chapter. 16 If an apology is in order, it is that the intro-
ductory materials are incomplete and potentially misleading. 
The introductory materials address the question of process values 
only indirectly. For one who regards that question as important in a 
course on complex litigation, it may be useful to provide additional 
background reading. For that purpose, I assign selections from a valu-
able collection of readings put together some years ago by the late 
Robert Cover and Owen Fiss.17 Those readings force students to con-
front values that compete, or that should compete, with efficient ad-
ministration in the lawmaking calculus. 18 The advantage of the 
readings lies precisely in their abstraction, their tendency to encourage 
critical analysis of both reform proposals and the rules we now have. 
14. See, e.g., Abrams, The New Civil Procedure (Book Review), 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1269 
(1986). 
15. See, e.g., G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 9, at 63-64. 
It is only when the nature or adequacy of a particular procedural structure is itself brought 
into issue that one finds a court addressing questions normally taken for granted: What do 
we wish procedure to do in this kind of case? What sort of procedural system will accom· 
plish that set of aims? What will it cost in money, and in values not readily monetized? 
How would such a system feed back upon norms and institutions already functioning in this 
and related areas? 
R. COVER & 0. Flss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 2 (1979). 
The suggested strategy is also treacherous because litigated cases may give a skewed view of 
process values in a system dominated by pre-trial dispositions. Moreover, exclusive attention to 
values informing, or that should inform, litigation procedure may hinder the effort to decide 
what disputes belong in court in the first place. See text accompanying notes 114-37 infra. 
16. See TEACHERS MANUAL, supra note 3, at 1. 
17. See R. COVER & 0. F1ss, supra note 15, at ch. 1 ("Valuing Process"). See also, e.g., 
Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for 
Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 893; Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); 
Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes - A Plea for "Process Values," 60 COR· 
NELL L. REV. 1 (1974). 
18. See R. COVER & 0. F1ss, supra note 15, at 7; Bush, supra note 17, at 929-30. 
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To the extent that the readings consider process values in the context 
of the constitutional norm of due process,19 they have an additional 
attraction. Students may begin to see a link between changing concep-
tions of the constitutional norm and the importance we attach to vari-
ous process values.20 More generally, consideration of process values 
may shed light on the movement toward alternative dispute resolution 
by calling into question premises reflected in the very name of that 
movement. 21 
A major theme of the authors' first chapter is that complex litiga-
tion is part of a "metamorphosis in litigation," as a result of which the 
courts are in crisis (pp. 1-13). The authors attribute these changes in 
litigation to procedural reforms, technological advances, and the 
proliferation of substantive law.22 But they also speak of an "ava-
lanche of cases" (p. 1), of "the litigation boom" (p. 2), and of "a grow-
ing public inclination to litigate virtually any issue" (p. 2). Moreover, 
they include an excerpt from an article23 in which the author refers to 
an "explosion" in civil litigation, arguing that ''judicial services are a 
scarce resource" that is being overtaxed (p. 5). 
Both the authors' introductory material and this excerpt exhibit 
the tendency, so well documented by Professor Galanter, to blur dis-
tinctions between types of cases (including complex litigation and 
other litigation), between litigation in the federal and state courts, be-
tween cases filed and cases tried, and between use and over-use of the 
courts.24 The result is a picture of the dispute landscape sadly lacking 
19. See Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect 
One's Rights-Part/, 1973 DUKEL.J. 1153, excerpted in R. COVER & 0. F1ss,supra note 15, at 
3-6; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search ofa Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976), 
excerpted in R. COVER & 0. Flss, supra note 15, at 18-26. 
20. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962); Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA 
L. REv. 997, 1008-10 (1983). 
21. See text accompanying notes 125-27 infra. 
22. See p. 1. Professor Bator vividly describes the last of these phenomena in speaking of 
"the promiscuity with which Congress and the courts have vied, in the past 25 years, to make our 
federal courts into dynamic litigation-attracting engines for the creation and expansion of rights 
and the redistribution of powers and entitlements in our society." Bator, The Judicial Universe 
of Judge Richard Posner (Book Review), 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1146, 1148 (1985). 
23. Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 497 (1979), excerpted at pp. 3-
5. 
24. See, e.g., Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Mo. L. REV. 3 (1986) 
[hereinafter Galanter, Litigation Explosion]; Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What 
We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious 
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Galanter, Landscape]. This is not to suggest 
that there are no problems. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 
59-129 (1985); Saks, If There Be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?, 46 Mo. L. REV. 63 (1986); 
Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a 
Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1817-20 (1986); Rhode, The 
Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 Mo. L. REV. 274, 276-88 (1986); Levin & Colliers, Contain-
ing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219 (1985). 
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in perspective, and the problem is not simply empirical. The rhetori-
cal tendency of the "litigation explosion" story is to deflect attention 
from values other than efficient administration in the effort to end the 
"crisis," dam the "flood," or stem the "avalanche." The authors do 
ask whether the "tendency toward efficiency, which makes lawsuits 
resemble administrative proceedings, [is] a desirable development."25 
But their own rhetoric may suggest that the answer to that question is 
irrelevant. 
The two readings provided as counterweights to the "litigation ex-
plosion" and "crisis in the adversary system" (pp. 13-22) stories seem, 
at least as edited and in light of intervening developments, short-
sighted. To be sure, one of them subjects the language of procedural 
reform to a microscope and decries the motivational pathology thus 
discovered.26 But in that respect the piece is an invitation to be cyni-
cal rather than critical.27 More important, both selections celebrate 
the existing system. The result may be a skewed view of reform alter-
natives, as well as a weak defense against the rhetoric of crisis. 
Professor Cha yes' influential article, The Role of the Judge in Pub-
lic Law Litigation,28 posited a shift in the nature of litigation that the 
author attributed to a basic reorientation in the way we think about 
litigation (p. 11). It encouraged us to regard the phenomenon as the 
norm.29 Indeed, Professor Chayes suggested that the changes he per-
ceived were the result of the purposive design of procedural reformers, 
rather than the unintended effects of their efforts. 30 
Professor Friedenthal's defense of the existing discovery system 
against comprehensive reform recognized the danger of using complex 
litigation as a norm for trans-substantive amendments (p. 20). He saw 
in the reform effort an attempt to redress the unintended substantive 
25. P. 9. See also p. 13 ("Is the administrative mode a necessary response by the courts to 
the demands of litigation?") 
26. See Friedenthal, supra note 11, at 813-14, excerpted at p. 18. 
27. See Rosenberg, Foreword, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 647, 648 (1981). 
28. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976), 
excerpted at pp. 9-13. 
29. See p. 10. In a subsequent section of his article not excerpted in Complex Litigation, 
Professor Chayes hedged on any quantitative claim. See Chayes, supra note 28, at 1303-04. Cf. 
Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 325 n.77 
(1986) ("Rather than argue about which oversimplification is more inaccurate, we should recog-
nize that modem litigation involves a broad spectrum of different kinds of disputes, and therefore 
that we need a variety of different processes."). 
30. The history is much more complicated than Professor Chayes suggests. See Subrin, 
supra note 7. Professor Subrin's work reveals, however, that for Dean Clark (the Reporter of the 
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) at least, a procedural system based on equity had as 
one of its attractions the capacity to accommodate public law litigation. See id. at 961-73. 
In this respect, Professor Chayes is closer to the mark than those who have attributed to the 
original rulemakers the paradigm of "the relatively simple diversity case." Compare Resnik, 
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 508 (1986), with 
Subrin, supra note 7, at 972-73 & n.375. 
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impact of the discovery rules (pp. 20-21). Acknowledging the exist-
ence of discovery abuse, he remitted litigants to the discretion of the 
trial judge or to changes in the substantive law (p. 20). 
Both Professor Chayes and Professor Friedenthal were anxious to 
defend the social gains made possible by the procedural system initi-
ated by the Federal Rules, which, it should constantly be borne in 
mind, have been considerable. They did not, however, seriously en-
gage its costs or question its premises. In the case of Professor 
Chayes, however, it is important to note that the effort was "prelimi-
nary" and "impressionistic."31 Moreover, he stressed the need for ad-
ditional research and identified a number of potential costs of his 
model. Today, his questions can no longer be ignored: 
Can the disinterestedness of the judge be sustained, for example, when he 
is more visibly a part of the political process? Will the consciously nego-
tiated character of the relief ultimately erode the sense that what is being 
applied is law?32 
* * * 
A critical question for research is whether this potential is or can be 
exploited to produce a party structure that is adequately representative 
in light of the consequences of public law litigation without introducing 
so much complexity that the procedure falls of its own weight. 33 
Professor Chayes correctly perceived that equity has triumphed in 
the remedial phase of litigation. 34 What he did not fully grasp is that 
equity triumphed throughout the Federal Rules. 35 That perception, 
recently and ably documented by Professor Subrin, 36 should provide 
additional focus to an inquiry into process values. Thus, to what ex-
tent did equity attach relatively greater importance to the values of 
participation and deterrence than to the values of dignity and e:tfectua-
tion?37 From a law reform perspective, focusing on equity suggests 
31. Chayes, supra note 28, at 1281. 
32. Id. at 1309. 
33. Id. at 1312. 
34. See pp. 12-13; Chayes, supra note 28, at 1292-96. 
35. For recognition by Professor Chayes of borrowing from equity, see Chayes, supra note 
28, at 1303. See also note 30 supra. 
36. See Subrin, supra note 7. See also G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 9, at 118 ("At the turn of 
this century, Maitland said that the common Jaw forms of action rule us from their graves. I 
think it can be said that the formulae of equity likewise rule us today. They will do so until they 
are met and mastered.") (footnote omitted); Burbank, supra note 8, at 1168 n.657. 
37. Dignity values reflect concern for the humiliation or Joss of self-respect which a person 
might suffer if denied an opportunity to litigate. Participation values reflect an appreciation 
of litigation as one of the modes in which persons exert influence, or have their wills 
"counted," in societal decisions they care about. Deterrence values recognize the instrumen-
tality of litigation as a mechanism for influencing or constraining individual behavior in 
ways thought socially desirable. Effectuation values see litigation as an important means 
through which persons are enabled to get, or are given assurance of having, whatever we are 
pleased to regard as rightfully theirs. 
R. COVER & 0. F1ss, supra note 15, at 4 (excerpting Michelman, supra note 19 (footnote omit-
ted)). Cf. Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
36 (1982) ("[T]o permit strict enforcement through the small claims class action is to elevate 
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that those who, with Professor Friedenthal, seek to preserve the gains 
made possible by the existing system without reexamining its premises 
are likely to lose. Those responsible for procedural reform know that 
discretion is an instrument of power.38 They know that what the 
Chancellor gives, the Chancellor can take away.39 It may be that the 
rulemakers should not concentrate on "turning back the clock"40 their 
predecessors built. But so long as discretion dominates procedure, 
procedure will dominate substantive law. 
Having said this, it is important to note that Complex Litigation 
permits teachers and students who are so inclined to pursue process 
values and hence some of the costs of complexity. Certainly, the 
materials on compulsory party joinder (pp. 51-79), intervention (pp. 
120-47), and class actions (pp. 233-498) are good vehicles for explor-
ing such questions, in particular the extent to which efficient adminis-
tration has assumed a dominant position in the calculus.41 My 
deterrent and punitive objectives over compensatory ones.") (footnote omitted). This article is 
excerpted at pp. 116-18. For caution about exclusive attention to adjudicatory procedure, see 
note 15 supra; notes 114-37 infra and accompanying text. 
38. "Discretion is, of course, an instrument of power. Those who would embrace it are well 
advised to consider where ultimate power lies and to be alert to the risks of its exercise." Bur-
bank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and 
Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 283, 309 (1982). "For Progressive proceduralists, the 
power of the state is embodied in the judge, and it is his authority that must be expanded if 
justice is to be done." Graham, supra note 9, at 943. 
39. Professor Chayes surely knows this too. Cf. Chayes, supra note 37, at 46 ("Control of 
remedial discretion is therefore an insistent problem in a public law system."). His defense 
against doctrinal manipulation may, however, be wishful thinking: 
[T]he public law trend does not simply reflect the political or ideological coloration of a 
generation offederaljudges. The development is rooted in much more pervasive changes in 
the contemporary "legal consciousness" - our ways of thinking about law and the legal 
system - that are in turn related to changes in the larger social, political, and cultural 
environment. If this claim is valid, it implies that the development in question can be af-
fected only marginally even by sustained resistance in the Supreme Court. 
Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). See Bush, supra note 17, at 943 ("The advocate of the disfavored 
'higher' or 'superior' goal would do better in practice to argue his case on the common ground of 
concrete social impact, since otherwise he may lose that ground by default, while maintaining the 
high ground of principle or ideology to little avail."). 
40. See Chayes, supra note 28, at 1313. In a similar vein, Professor Friedenthal asserts that 
"[f]rom a theoretical point of view, the current practice of allowing general pleadings and exten-
sive discovery cannot seriously be challenged." Friedenthal, supra note 11, at 816-17. But cf. 
Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 651 (questioning whether "the 'hope of discovering a claim' [is] a 
proper purpose of discovery, as Professor Friedenthal forthrightly argues"). 
41. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972), excerpted at pp. 
135-45, provides a marvelous vehicle for considering a number of process values in the context of 
intervention. Moreover, although the court accorded great weight to the value of participation, 
it is evident from the constraints placed on the intervenors, see p. 145, that what one hand gives, 
the other may take away. See also Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 
CoRNELL L. REV. 779, 779-80 (1985) (exploring "the inescapable tension between the interest of 
individual litigants in preserving individual control of claims and procedural fairness ••• and the 
interest of the judicial system in the efficient joinder of related claims."). 
As a constituent element of the effect of current approaches to complex litigation on individ-
ual control, a calculation of the costs of complexity should consider their effect on the lawyer-
client relationship. See, e.g., pp. 476-98 (judicial control of class action settlements); pp. 643-53 
(lead and liaison counsel). 
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comments reflect one teacher's conviction that the perspective is suffi-
ciently important to warrant more extensive and self-conscious atten-
tion at the outset of a course in complex litigation. Moreover, they 
reflect my concern that because we are educating the next generation 
of law reformers, it is important at least to set a framework for the 
consideration of reform, even in a course with an avowedly practical 
orientation. 
II. PROCEDURE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POWER 
The excerpt from Professor Friedenthal's article discussed above42 
introduces the reader of Complex Litigation to an important theme 
recurring throughout the book: the influence of "procedural" rules on 
the substantive law. The authors invite students to consider the prob-
lem of tailoring procedure to the substantive law and the extent to 
which procedure makes possible, or drives, changes in the substantive 
law. Here again, I have found it useful to supplement the material in 
the casebook with readings from The Structure of Procedure. 43 But 
here, the materials ably speak for themselves. 
The issues suggested by the theme of procedure as an instrument of 
power are not unique to complex litigation, but Complex Litigation 
permits, indeed encourages, consideration of them. In the materials 
on party joinder and consolidation, students are repeatedly exposed to 
the substantive implications of joinder44 and led to consider the extent 
to which efficiency concerns cause courts to bend the requirements of 
procedural rules,45 to pursue dubious packaging strategies that are 
supposedly provisional but that in substantive terms may be irremedi-
able, 46 and, alternatively, to pursue dubious substantive strategies that 
enable packaging.47 A recurring question raised by the authors' 
materials is which - joinder or change in the substantive law - is the 
chicken and which the egg. That question is particularly insistent in 
mass tort cases, which receive due attention from the authors.48 It is 
42. See text following note 30, and text accompanying notes 38-40 supra. 
43. See R. COVER & O. F1ss, supra note 15, ch. 2 ("The Independence of Procedure?"). 
44. See, e.g., pp. 28-32, 38-51, 191-206. 
45. See, e.g., pp. 51-58 (compulsory party joinder). It is particularly instructive to compare 
Whyham v. Piper Aircraft Corp., pp. 51-57, with Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, pp. 71-77. 
46. See pp. 194-203 (pre-trial consolidation including consolidated complaint). 
47. See pp. 38-51 (permissive party joinder without resolving choice-of-law question). 
48. See, e.g., pp. 319-33 & 340-53 (class actions). One's answer to the question whether a 
DES plaintiff proceeding under a theory of market-share liability should be required to demon-
strate "due diligence" in seeking to identify the manufacturer of the drug taken by her mother 
may depend on one's choice of a procedural or substantive perspective. If one regards cases such 
as Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 912 (1980), discussed at pp. 48-50, as providing procedural solutions to problems of 
proof - in effect establishing a presumption - a requirement of due diligence approaches a 
logical imperative. That is, one of the basic facts is that plaintiff, through no fault of her own, 
has been unable to identify the manufacturer. If, on the other hand, one regards market share 
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perhaps most sharply put in the materials on class actions, where we 
see a court use a presumption to reallocate burdens, thereby overcom-
ing a major obstacle to class certification, and respond to a charge of 
overreaching by announcing that the presumption is available in indi-
vidual actions. 49 It could also have been pursued with profit in the 
context of settlement, because that context vividly illustrates both the 
instrumental use of provisional substantive strategies50 and the propo-
sition that alternative dispute resolution represents the ultimate tri-
umph of equity (and defeat of law).51 
The premise implicit in the above, that complex litigation may ex-
act a cost when the procedural system designed to accommodate it 
effects changes in the substantive law, requires refinement. Professor 
Graham has speculated that academics embrace what he calls "the 
Progressive drive for procedural uniformity"52 because of their 
unconscious understanding that lack of uniformity is a threat to the 
claim that procedure is a value-free science. If there is more than one 
scientifically valid way to litigate, then the choice of one or the other 
procedural system must be based on values; in other words, the selection 
of one mode of proceeding over another is a political choice. 53 
It is true that procedural rules are never neutral in their effects, if 
not their purposes.54 It is also likely that there has been more system-
atic misrepresentation about the value-free nature of procedural rules 
than about any other category in the traditional lexicon. But what 
does it mean to say that procedural choices are "political"? To some it 
may mean either that procedural choices are driven by an individual's 
own substantive values or that they should be. One holding that view 
liability as a theory of substantive law disembodied from the procedural setting that brought it 
forth, due diligence is irrelevant. See generally Note, The Application of a Due Diligence Require· 
ment to Market Share Theory in DES Litigation, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 771 (1986). 
49. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975), excerpted at pp. 265-75. The 
court's treatment of damages in the context of adequacy of representation is amenable to a simi· 
Jar analysis. See pp. 272-75. See generally Scott, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule JOb-5, 38 
U. CHI. L. REv. 337 (1971), excerpted in R. COVER & 0. Flss, supra note 15, at 86-94. Of 
course, as Professor Scott points out, the quest for efficient administration is not the only value 
- indeed, it may not plausibly be deemed important - in leading courts to creative solutions in 
the class action context. See id. at 93-94. See also pp. 7-9, 319-33 {rule 23{b){l) class actions). 
50. See Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 351-53 (1986); Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in 
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 65·66 {1986), 
See also pp. 86-87. 
51. See text accompanying notes 114-36 infra. 
52. Graham, supra note 9, at 945. 
53. Id. 
54. Consider a rule requiring that an answer to a complaint be filed within twenty days of 
service. See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(a). The purpose of the rule is evidently to ensure that once a 
lawsuit is commenced it proceeds. The rule is inherently arbitrary in the sense that within a 
certain range it is hard to argue persuasively for one period over another. But the rule is not 
neutral. Some people will have greater difficulty than others complying with the rule, whether 
because of lack of legal sophistication or lack of access to a lawyer. Thus, even the most neutral-
appearing rule can have differential impact. See e.g., Elliott, supra note 29, at 325-26. 
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may be suspicious of the purposes of every judge or law reformer who 
has a choice in the application or formulation of doctrine. There is, 
however, a difference between purposes and effects. Neither judges 
nor procedural reformers have a general charter to reform society, and 
broad-scale social reform would be necessary to eradicate the non-neu-
tral effects of many, and perhaps most, procedural rules. 
If procedural rules are not neutral and judges and reformers 
should not use procedural rules to advance their own substantive val-
ues, we encounter a paradox: neutral transmission of the substantive 
law, if possible, would itself be a political act because it would rein-
force the status quo. The paradox disappears to the extent that one 
can distinguish individuals' values from the values that inform the 
rules of substantive law.ss The reminder that there is no bright line 
between procedure and substantive law has been a refuge of pro-
cedural reformers for fifty years. But the existence of "under-
determinacy" is no reason to wipe the slate clean. s6 
According to this view, the perception that procedural rules are 
not neutral makes it important to try to identify the impact of proce-
dural rules and to be candid in describing that impact. The perception 
also makes it important to be candid in describing the purposes of 
procedural rules. Because avowedly procedural rules may have either 
substantive purposes or substantive effects, consideration should be 
given to the political legitimacy of the process by which they are for-
mulated or applied and of the actors who are formulating or applying 
them. Rather than giving up on the procedure/substance dichotomy, 
we should craft it with attention to its ultimately political 
ramifications. s1 
There is today increasing movement towards, and interest in, de-
partures from the norm of trans-substantive procedure. ss In consider-
55. Even when the values that inform the rules of substantive law are indeterminate, 
it is not true (although it is today often said) that a judge's decision not to intervene to 
change something is "as much" a decision as a decision to change it. The latter entails, the 
former does not, an (additional) coercive intervention, which enforces the judge's opinion on 
how things should be. It should not be indulged in unless the relevant authoritative texts 
strongly support it. 
Bator, supra note 22, at 1165. 
56. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 8, at 1133-35 n.530, 1187-89. Cf. Galanter, Landscape, 
supra note 24, at 71: 
If interpretation is inevitable, how can one be superior to another? This shouldn't be much 
of a puzzle for lawyers. We are in the business of assessing competing interpretations. We 
know that just because something can be said for one reading of a matter, it is not automati-
cally a toss-up between that and some other view. 
See also Bator, supra note 22, at 1163 ("The fact that interpretation does not admit to some 
mechanical procedure of validation is not a fatal objection to the concept of interpretation."). 
For the concept of "underdeterminacy," see Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing 
Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987). 
57. See, e.g., Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68 - Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 425 (1986). 
58. See, e.g., T. WILLGING, AsBESTOS CASE MANAGEMENT: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCE-
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ing the alternatives, it is important to distinguish between procedure 
that is tailored to the case, in the sense that it is ad hoc, and procedure 
crafted in advance for a type of case. Many of the Federal Rules au-
thorize essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are trans-substantive 
in only the most trivial sense. The trend may be toward rules confer-
ring greater discretion on the trial judge. 59 I have already suggested 
that discretion will not preserve the substantive law. 60 The issue of 
trans-substantiveness is linked with the issue of formalism. 61 
The general charters that today masquerade as rules62 present no 
necessary logical obstacle to the historic procedural goal of delivering 
substantive rights. 63 Both my own analyses under the Enabling Act 
and Professor Cover's more speculative work suggest that nonformal 
rules, whether embodied in Federal Rules or in case law, need not 
DURES 15-24, 31-35 (1985); Subrin, supra note 7, at 977, 985, 991, 995-96; Marcus, The Revival 
of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986); 
Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REv. 243 (1984). 
59. See, e.g., FED. R. C!v. P. 16. The recent amendments dealing with sanctions may only 
be an apparent exception to this trend. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11, 16(f), 26(g); Burbank, supra note 
20, at 1008-10. 
60. See text accompanying notes 34-40 supra. 
61. Cf Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PRO· 
CESS: NoMos XVIII 126, 129 (1977) ("a procedure is formal insofar as its .•• purpose is to 
vindicate legal entitlement, to secure to an individual that which is rightfully his"). 
62. Surely it is the function of law, or at least one of its functions, to put certain questions 
beyond dispute or present re-examination. By this I do not mean scientific dispute or re-
examination, nor do I mean that the rules themselves ought not to be re-examined, as when 
a statute is amended or a case overruled. What I do mean is that a rule, to have cognitive 
and normative significance as such, must have an important degree of determinative content 
to the group to whom it is addressed. To the extent that the rule says only that the adjudica-
tor is to "use his sound discretion," the rule as a rule says nothing about the disposition of 
the controversy, except to designate who is to make the disposition. To adopt a rule that has 
determinative content is of course to forego in some measure the quest for ''.justice" in par-
ticular cases that has been such a strong motivation in the recent past. Yet it seems clear 
that the quest for ''.justice," carried to its extremes, is every bit as futile and therefore every 
bit as destructive of a legal order as the quest for "certainty" proved to be when carried to 
its extremes .... 
The construction of satisfactory legal generalizations ought to be the special province of 
legal scholarship, for legal scholars are most free of the pressures of time and interest that 
impair careful and circumspect analysis. Yet there seems relatively little productive effort 
along these lines. Perhaps this is because the impact of legal realism has induced a shyness 
or even embarrassment about attempting generalization. 
G. HAZARD, JR., supra note 9, at 9-11. 
63. Our infatuation with equity has helped us to forget the historic purpose of adjudica-
tion. Courts exist not only to resolve disputes, but to resolve them in a way that takes law 
seriously by trying to apply legal principles to the events that brought the parties to court. 
The total victory of equity process has caused us to forget the essence of civil adjudication: 
enabling citizens to have their legitimate expectancies and rights fulfilled. We are good at 
using equity process and thought to create new general rights. We have, however, largely 
failed at defining rights and providing methods for their efficient vindication. The effort to 
defeat formalism so that society could move forward toward new ideas of social justice 
neglected the benefits of formalism once new rights had been created. 
Subrin, supra note 7, at 1001. Cf Bator, supra note 22, at 1148 (suggesting a "connection be-
tween rising caseloads and the instability, unpredictability, and vagueness of our constitutional, 
statutory, and judge-made law"). 
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raise allocation of power issues. 64 The concern, however, is that sub-
stantive policy choices will be buried, a concern that implicates both 
democratic values and the values of Justice Harlan's vision of law.65 
Consideration of democratic values suggests that whatever one 
thinks of the goal of trans-substantive Federal Rules it may be folly to 
have as a goal their adoption by the states. 66 State courts historically 
have had much greater freedom to fashion common law than have the 
federal courts. 67 If state courts' substantive policy choices are buried 
in the application of "adjective law," the issue may only be one of 
accountability in the weak sense - of a court publicly taking responsi-
bility for decisions that it is empowered to make (and thus risking 
legislative override). 
Federal courts, on the other hand, are thought to be significantly 
more constrained in their lawmaking powers, particularly in state-law 
cases. 68 Their buried substantive policy choices therefore are more 
likely to raise the issue of accountability in both the weak sense just 
described and in the strong sense of allocation of power. 69 
These observations suggest another way to view the occasion of the 
effectiveness of the Federal Rules, of the Erie decision, 70 and of the 
"new federal common law,"71 in the same year. As rules of equity 
procedure, the Federal Rules permitted the federal courts to retain 
64. See Burbank, supra note 8, at 1193; Burbank, supra note 20, at 1008; Burbank, supra note 
57, at 430, 433-34; Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 
84 YALE L.J. 718, 722-40 (1975), excerpted in R. COVER & 0. Flss, supra note 15, at 75-85. 
65. Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental 
than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and duties 
of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences 
in an orderly predictable manner. Without such a "legal system," social organization and 
cohesion are virtually impossible .... Put more succinctly, it is this injection of the rule of 
law that allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists call the "state 
of nature." 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1970), quoted in Subrin, supra note 7, at 988. See also 
Summers, supra note 17, at 21-22 (process legitimacy), 25-26 (procedural legality). But see 
Chayes, supra note 28, at 1313-16 (legitimacy). 
66. For a recent attempt to assess the extent of state borrowing, see Oakley & Coon, The 
Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. 
REV. 1367 (1986). 
67. See, e.g., Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 
(1985). Cf Bator, supra note 22, at 1164-65 (distinguishing between federal and state courts in 
discussing reasons for judicial self-restraint and deference). 
68. See, e.g., Jay, supra note 67; Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and 
Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 753-62, 778-
97 (1986). 
69. See, e.g., Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., 726 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1984) (FEo. R. C1v. P. 42); 
Burbank, supra note 8, at 1193 & n.763. Cf Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345 
(3d Cir. 1986) (federal standing decision submerging question whether injured party can seek 
reformation of insurance contract under state law). 
70. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
71. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 383 (1964); Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
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some of their historic power, even in state-law cases, without appear-
ing to do so. 
III. CREATING COMPLEXITY 
Complex Litigation provides many opportunities to explore the 
costs and benefits of using the Federal Rules to create litigation that is 
complex by reason of its structure (parties or issues). The chapter on 
judicial control of litigation (pp. 593-737) sharpens that perspective. 
Moreover, this material and the authors' chapter on duplicative or re-
lated litigation (pp. 148-232) prompt the questions whether we are on 
the road to even more complex litigation and why. 
The chapter on judicial control of litigation revisits issues that 
from the perspective of law reform are among the most important in 
the field of procedure. How those issues are resolved will influence the 
procedural systems of the twenty-first century. 
The recent reforms in the system we inherited from 1938 have been 
in the nature of adjustments, often inspired by informal measures pre-
viously adopted. Those responsible for both have articulated as their 
dominant concerns abuses of the existing system and the need to tailor 
existing mechanisms to the demands of modern litigation. Judges and 
law reformers have returned again and again to the state of the courts' 
dockets (pp. 593-606). But it is surely simplistic to see in what they 
say only a desire for more efficient administration. As Professor Ga-
lanter has observed, reform rhetoric about case overload is now at-
tended by rhetoric about over-use, 72 a different type of abuse; 
moreover, judicial control implicates judicial power. 
There is nothing wrong with a strategy of reform that looks to 
make adjustments in the existing system, so long as that system is basi-
cally sound. To determine whether the system is sound, it would help 
to have some historical perspective on the system, its underlying goals 
and assumptions. As I have previously suggested, procedural reform-
ers characteristically neglect such matters. 73 
A historical perspective on judicial control of litigation would in-
volve inquiry as to the place of judicial management in the system 
initiated by the Federal Rules. Both the published work and unpub-
lished papers of Edson Sunderland, the chief architect of the rules on 
discovery, pre-trial conference, and summary judgment, suggest that 
he thought those mechanisms would measurably assist in separating 
the wheat from the chaff.74 Thus, the recent amendments to rule 16 
72. See Galanter,Landscape, supra note 24, at 5-11, 61-71. Cf text accompanying notes 116· 
17 infra ("warm" and "cool" themes in discussion of settlement). 
73. See text accompanying notes 8-9 & 15 supra. 
74. See, e.g., Letter from Edson R. Sunderland to Harry D. Nims (Nov. 1, 1935) (Edson R. 
Sunderland Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of 
Michigan, box 4, folder N) [hereinafter Sunderland Papers]; Letter from Edson R. Sunderland to 
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(pp. 602-04) and the current effort to revise rule 5675 can be rational-
ized and justified as an attempt to make the Federal Rules work as 
they were intended to work. In other respects, recent amendments 
can be seen as corrections of the original draftsmen's mistakes. Thus, 
amended rule 11 (p. 606) and the provision in amended rule 16 au-
thorizing the "participants" at a pre-trial conference to "consider and 
take action with respect to . . . the formulation and simplification of 
issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses"76 rep-
resent a return to techniques of control that, as Professor Subrin has 
demonstrated, were considered and rejected during the drafting of the 
original Federal Rules.11 
Harry D. Nims (Sept. 11, 1937) (id.); E. Sunderland, The Principles Underlying the New Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 13-23 (undated) (Sunderland Papers, box 18). See also Subrin, supra 
note 7, at 979; Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REv. 
215 (1937) [hereinafter Sunderland, Theory and Practice]; Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial 
Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REv. 737 (1939) [hereinafter Sunderland, Discovery 
Before Trial]; Sunderland, Trends in Procedural Law, 1 LA. L. REv. 477, 486-88, 494-98 (1939). 
For Sunderland's role in drafting these rules, see Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 MICH. L. REv. 6, 10 (1959). Clark recalled that "Mr. Mitchell 
[chairman of the Advisory Committee] himself had a major hand in the final rewording of rule 
16," but he observed that "its original conception, as well as the several rules for discovery and 
summary judgment, was and now remains a tribute to Edson's genius." Id. 
According to Professor Elliott, "as the framers envisioned their new system, the issue-nar-
rowing function was to be performed not by pleading, but by discovery and summary judgment." 
Elliott, supra note 29, at 319. Although convenient to Elliott's evolutionary thesis, see also Al-
schuler, supra note 24, at 1832, this account neglects the importance that Sunderland in particu-
lar attached to the pretrial conference, which he sometimes discussed as a form of judicial 
discovery: 
It is clear that the court, as well as the parties, has a direct interest in eliminating ficti-
tious and non-substantial issues before trial, so as to avoid the waste of time that inevitably 
occurs under our traditional procedure. In other words, the court itself ought to be inter-
ested in a type of discovery designed to determine what are the real issues to be tried. This 
discovery would supplement the discovery instituted by the parties, and might very well 
come after the parties have made such use as they care to of the discovery methods available 
to themselves. At that stage the parties would be in a position to give the court a very 
definite idea of their real attitude toward the various apparent issues appearing on the rec-
ord, if the court should undertake, by means of a conference with attorneys representing 
both parties, to probe into the question of the possibilities of proof. 
This type of discovery, instituted by the court at its own instance and in its own interest, 
is provided by rule 16. Under this rule the court in its discretion in any case, or by general 
rule, may hold a pre-trial hearing to consider: (1) Simplifying the issues; (2) Amendments; 
(3) Admission of facts or documents; (4) Limiting the number of expert witnesses; (5) Refer-
ences; (6) Other matters likely to aid in the disposition of the matter. 
Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial, supra, at 753. 
It is true, however, that the Advisory Committee had rejected a proposal that would have 
bestowed greater power on trial judges to formulate the issues to be tried. See Subrin, supra note 
7, at 978-79; text accompanying notes 76-77 infra. Moreover, not even Professor Sunderland 
seems to have contemplated judicial conduct, as opposed to judicial control, of fact gathering. 
For a proposal to that end, see Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 823, 825 (1985). 
75. See note 78 infra. Dean Carrington, the reporter for the Civil Rules Advisory Commit-
tee, has been working on revisions of rule 56. See Letter from Paul D. Carrington to Stephen B. 
Burbank (Aug. 4, 1986) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
77. See Subrin, supra note 7, at 977-79 (verification of complaint and order formulating is-
sues to be tried). See note 74 supra. 
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On another view, however, both the recent amendments to the 
Federal Rules and the rulemakers' agenda for future reforms relating 
to judicial control of litigation 78 should cause us to question the prem-
ises of the system we inherited before adjusting it. Loosening the stan-
dards for summary judgment will further empower federal judges at 
the expense of juries. 79 The same is true of recent amendments to rule 
16 on pre-trial procedure. 80 Everyone admits that there has been 
abuse of the litigation process in federal courts, but in a formless sys-
tem, abuse may be in the eye of the beholder. Perhaps more impor-
tant, the recent emphasis on punishing lawyers and their clients81 
tends to deflect attention - a tried and true technique of procedural 
reform82 - in this case, from the abuses of federal judges and from 
their responsibility to resist easy solutions, including prominently 
those that empower them. 83 
If it turns out, as I expect it will turn out, that adjustments to the 
received system are not enough to make it work in the way in which 
the demands of the next century will require, a historical perspective 
will also be useful in designing an alternative system. For this pur-
pose, the central perception may be that the Federal Rules, merging 
78. Gignoux [the chairman of the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure] informed one and all that bis standing committee's Advisory Com· 
mittee on Civil Rules ... was "initiating a comprehensive review of the structure of the 
rules," with special attention to rule 56, the prosecution of class actions under rule 23, and 
the use of sanctions under rule 11. 
In an interview, Gignoux characterized the review of those rules as "the first step" 
toward a broader re-evaluation of the Federal Rules. He explained "the general thought" is 
that instead of simply "reacting" individually to problems with the rules, federal judges 
should "look back at what's happened after 50 years and see whether the rules need basic 
restructuring and improvement." 
Grabam,ADR Conference Ai~ Hopes-And Some Doubts, Legal Times, Oct. 14, 1985, at 2, col. 
1. 
79. See Subrin, supra note 7, at 968-69, 972-73, 998-1000. This process has already begun. 
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). 
80. See Sherman, supra note 11, at 745-46. 
81. See pp. 606-27; Burbank, supra note 20. 
82. See Burbank, supra note 57, at 426-27; Graham, supra note 9, at 942-43. 
83. See Strande]] v. Jackson County, Ill., 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. III. 1987) (criminal contempt 
sanction imposed on attorney for refusing to participate in summary jury trial); 55 U.S.L.W. 
2120 (Aug. 26,1986) ("Based on his observations, [Judge] Feikens reported that the judges who 
impose the most sanctions have the longest dockets in that district court."). See also Sarokin, 
Justice Rushed is Justice Denied, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 431 (1986). 
In an interesting essay, Professor Fiss discusses the dangers of .some of the methods that 
federal judges have devised for dealing with complex litigation, to wit, the use of judicial surro-
gates such as magistrates and special masters. See Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 
92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983). See also R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 102-19 (law clerks and staff 
attorneys). Fiss correctly argues that a "Weberian emphasis on rigidity" or a charge of "exces-
sive rule-bound behavior," Fiss, supra, at 1451 (emphasis in original), cannot properly be im-
puted to the federal judiciary. But he fails to see that in this respect more bureaucracy may 
prove a cure rather than a disease. See Elliott, supra note 29, at 317; note 90 infra. For reference 
to a magistrate, see pp. 627-43. 
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law and equity, gave us equity rather than law,84 and that the 1966 
amendments made the triumph complete. 85 Of what use was it to talk 
about the evils of common law or code procedure without also identi-
fying the evils of equity procedure and how your system would avoid 
them?86 Today, we should not be talking about the decline of adjudi-
catory procedure, except perhaps as one would at a wake. 87 Long ago, 
Professor Sunderland rejected on grounds of "economic extrava-
gance" the theory of procedure according to which the "parties them-
selves framed their own controversies, and laid them before the court 
for decision" and the "judges never sought to protect themselves or 
the parties from the useless trial of issues based upon allegations or 
denials which had no colorable existence in fact. " 88 That does not 
mean that the critics are wrong. It means, rather, that history has 
passed them by. If present trends are to be reversed, we may indeed 
need to "tum back the clock,"89 to see whether it is possible to merge 
law and equity, adversariness and judicial control, without submerging 
one or the other. The enterprise will reveal substantial - perhaps 
unacceptable - costs, but the relevant comparison is not just the costs 
of the equity-based procedure initiated in 1938.90 As Complex Litiga-
tion shows, federal judges are moving further beyond equity, in some 
cases returning to practices previously rejected, even at the trial stage. 
So long as efficient administration and judicial control (power) are 
considered the summa bona of procedure, a requirement that "the di-
rect testimony of witnesses under the control of a party be presented in 
the form of narrative written statements"91 makes eminent sense. It 
84. See Subrin, supra note 7; note 63 supra and accompanying text. 
85. The 1966 amendments included revisions of the rules governing compulsory joinder (rule 
19), intervention (rule 24), and class actions (rule 23). See generally Kaplan, Continuing Work of 
the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 81 
HARV. L. REV. 356, 591 (1967-68). 
86. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra. In fact, as Professor Subrin has noted, propo-
nents of Supreme Court rulemaking and of the Federal Rules "repeatedly cited the case of 
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in Dickens' Bleakhouse as representative of the type of technicality they 
were trying to avoid," forgetting "that a major point of the novel was the perpetual fog surround-
ing Chancery." Subrin, supra note 7, at 982 (footnote omitted). 
87. See notes 30 & 74 supra. 
88. Sunderland, Theory and Practice, supra note 74, at 215. See also Sunderland, Discovery 
Before Trial, supra note 74, at 737. 
89. See text accompanying note 40 supra. 
90. "The attempt to escape the necessity of making explicit cost-benefit judgments about 
procedure merely leads to evasive techniques like managerial judging that invite judges to narrow 
issues in an ad hoc fashion without safeguards." Elliott, supra note 29, at 321 (emphasis in 
original). Elsewhere, however, Professor Elliott suggests that recent amendments to rule 26 may 
be sufficient for this purpose in the context of discovery. See id. at 322. Although the amended 
rule provides standards for decisionmaking, there remains cause for concern about the breadth of 
discretion afforded, see text accompanying notes 38-40 supra, as well as about the efficiency of a 
procedural system that must rely on ad hoc decisions. 
91. W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION: A 
HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES§ 7-3(A) (1982), reprinted at p. 613. See Sherman, 
supra note 11, at 746. 
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recalls the days when suits in equity were determined largely on the 
paper record created by the parties.92 But the Supreme Court changed 
that system in its Equity Rules of 1912, and it perpetuated the require-
ment that the "testimony of witnesses . . . be taken orally in open 
court" in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.93 Ironically, efficient 
administration was also a goal in 1912,94 but neither then nor in 1937 
(when the Court promulgated the Federal Rules) was it the only value 
served by requiring live testimony.95 
Some law reformers, including some federal judges, do not like ju-
ries. 96 Jury trials, particularly in complex cases, appear inefficient, 
and they undoubtedly derogate from the power of trial judges. It is no 
surprise that, here again, calls for reform include allegations of incom-
petence. 97 Happily, here as elsewhere, Professor Galanter's work may 
help to shed some empirical light on the reform debate.98 Moreover, 
careful scholarship has thwarted attempts to find historical support for 
an exception to the constitutional right to jury trial in complex cases.99 
But some have not been deterred. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit has ruled that permitting a case to be tried to a jury may 
in some circumstances violate due process. 100 
When a case's complexity results wholly or in part from the join-
der of parties and claims permitted or required by procedural rules, 
there is something odd about reasoning that uses the costs of complex-
ity as the excuse for denying trial by jury. We are confronted by the 
spectacle of the government denying an explicit constitutional right in 
92. Professor Sherman asks whether an "offer of proof" procedure portends a "move away 
from the traditional Anglo-American notion that oral testimony elicited through direct and cross 
examination of a witness observed by the factfinder is the preferred form of evidence." Sherman, 
supra note 11, at 746. That was not the tradition in equity. See Lane, Federal Equity Rules, 35 
HARV. L. REv. 276, 278, 291-92 (1922). 
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a). Equity Rule 46 provided in pertinent part that "[i]n all trials in 
equity the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, except as otherwise pro-
vided by statute or these rules." 226 U.S. 661 {1912). 
94. See Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701, 706-07 (1927). 
95. See Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws 
to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, 36 A.B.A. REP. 448, 456-59 (1911); 3 J. 
MOORE & J. FRIEDMAN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 43.02 (1938); Subrin, supra note 7, at 
979, 986. 
96. This is a long tradition. See Subrin, supra note 7, at 968-69. For a relatively recent 
manifestation, see Remarks of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Meeting of the Conference of 
Chief Judges, Flagstaff, Ariz. (Aug. 7, 1979) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
97. See Burger, supra note 96. See also M. Galanter, Jury Shadows: Reflections on the Civil 
Jury and the "Litigation Explosion" 1-3 (rev. ed. Nov. 1986) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on 
file with the Michigan Law Review). 
98. See M. Galanter, supra note 97. 
99. See Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litiga-
tion, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980); Arnold, A Modest Replication to a Lengthy Discourse, 128 
U. PA. L. REV. 986 (1980). 
100. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980), excerpted at 
pp. 679-80. 
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order to remedy a supposed constitutional problem for which the gov-
ernment itself is at least partially responsible. 101 This is the case when 
complexity results from enforced joinder, including by operation of 
preclusion rules, 102 or from joinder initiated by a party who seeks to 
avoid a jury trial. Even when the party seeking a jury trial is responsi-
ble, one might suppose that before denying the constitutional right the 
court would explore the option of breaking the lawsuit into smaller, 
less complex packages, and thus unraveling complexity the govern-
ment has helped to create.103 
In this light, one may be less sanguine about what I have called 
definitional agnosticism or the shotgun approach to complex litigation. 
In the introduction to their chapter on the disposition of duplicative or 
related litigation, the authors of Complex Litigation tell us: 
Litigation may be called complex because of the joinder of multiple 
parties, the difficulty of the issues involved, or the volume of discovery 
and evidence necessitating substantial court administration. Sometimes, 
however, cases take on complexities by virtue of their relationship to 
other cases. Although filed separately, cases can be so clearly related 
that they should be looked at as part of the same piece of litigation. If 
such cases are tried separately without considering their relationship to 
other pending litigation, the objective of just and efficient resolution of 
disputes may be frustrated. Allowing separate cases between the same 
parties on the same or similar issues to proceed independently is not only 
wasteful, but encourages parties to forum shop and to try to obtain an 
advantage by multiple litigation of the same matters. Even when sepa-
rate cases have only some of the same parties or issues, separate litigation 
can be wasteful and can result in inconsistent or conflicting determina-
tions, leading to uncertainty as to what has been decided and as to the 
impact of judgments in other suits. [p. 148] 
It is common ground that courts require the tools necessary to pre-
vent or discourage parties from conducting duplicative litigation, 
whether the tool of choice be an injunction or a preclusion rule. There 
has been some pressure on preclusion law to open up the category of 
persons who may be bound by prior litigation.104 Proposals to that 
end are useful for present purposes because they illustrate that a cost 
of taking an expansive view of complex litigation for reform purposes 
may be to undermine values traditionally associated with due pro-
101. Cf. p. 683 ("Don't many of the complexities of litigation now result from joinder and 
other procedural mechanisms that did not exist [in 1791]?"). 
102. "[A]s the rules of procedure have expanded the scope of the initial opportunity to liti-
gate, they have invited a corresponding expansion of the extent to which that opportunity fore-
closes a subsequent opportunity. . . . [T]his is the clear tendency of the modern law of res 
judicata." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 11.2, at 589 (3d ed. 1985). 
103. Cf. p. 683 ("Can other procedural mechanisms such as bifurcation be used to ameliorate 
the difficulties posed by these procedural innovations?"). 
104. See, e.g., pp. 739-59, 783-92; George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the 
Collateral Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REv. 655 (1980); McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty 
Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 709-10, 714-18 (1976). 
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cess. 105 But preclusion law is not where reform proposals are likely to 
center. Their focus is likely to be on mechanisms for packaging re-
lated litigation. 
In an interesting recent article, Professor Rowe and Mr. Sibley 
have proposed a federal statute that would exploit the jurisdictional 
potential of federal courts to deal with related litigation. 106 Others 
have been concerned about the implications of a recent Supreme Court 
decision for class actions, state and federal. 107 These are worthwhile 
areas of inquiry. Those considering reform proposals should remem-
ber, however, that in dealing with dispersed litigation regarded as 
complex because it is related, they run the risk of creating litigation 
packages that are complex because of their structure. 108 If, as I have 
argued, we have not yet adequately addressed the costs of current ar-
rangements for litigation in the federal (or state) courts,109 it would be 
hard to justify reforms that exacerbate those costs. Yes, we can rede-
fine fairness, 110 but let us be precise about both the values we seek to 
further in our procedural systems and those that are protected by the 
Constitution. 111 Efficient administration is one such value, although 
105. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979). See also text 
accompanying notes 110-13 infra; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2980 (1985) 
("[A state] may not take a transaction with little or no relationship to the forum and apply the 
Jaw of the forum in order to satisfy the procedural requirement that there be a 'common question 
of law.'"). 
106. See Rowe & Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 
U. PA. L. REv. 7 (1986). The problem the authors address is "the unavailability of any single 
forum in which to consolidate scattered, related litigation - a difficulty that is becoming more 
and more common given the increasing number of complex tort actions ..•. " Id. at 9 (footnote 
omitted). They note that "[t]he American Law Institute (ALI) has undertaken a preliminary 
study of possible reforms in the statutes and rules governing complex litigation; the project's 
purview includes consideration of changes in federal subject matter jurisdiction, removal, venue, 
consolidation, process, and choice of law.'' Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted). See Proposal for Pre· 
liminary Study of Revision of Statutes and Procedural Rules Governing Complex Civil Litigation, 
7 A.L.I. REP., July 1985, at 11-12. 
107. See Miller & Crump, supra note 50 (discussing Shutts). The authors include sections 
entitled "Procedural Tools for Judicial Management of Multistate Class Actions," id. at 67-74, 
and "Legislative Solutions to the Questions Raised by Shutts," id. at 74-80. In the latter section, 
the authors note that the ALI Study Project on Complex Litigation, see note 106 supra, includes 
consideration of federal jurisdiction in multiparty, multistate disputes. See id. at 75, 76 & n.522, 
79 & n.538. 
108. Rowe and Sibley are aware of this risk. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 106, at 17. See 
also Miller & Crump, supra note 50, at 79-80. But see note 109 infra. 
109. Rowe and Sibley count as possible costs of their proposals the creation of litigation that 
is unwieldy and the sacrifice of "important interests in individual control of actions and fair 
treatment of individual claims.'' Rowe & Sibley, supra note 106, at 17. See also Trangsrud, 
supra note 41. This is by no means a complete catalogue of the costs of complexity. See, e.g., 
note 41 supra; text accompanying notes 53-71 & 101-103 supra,· text accompanying notes 114-37 
infra. For that reason, I am not sanguine that "tools of court management [will] minimize the 
dangers of consolidation.'' Rowe & Sibley, supra note 106, at 17. 
110. See Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 
1643 (1985). 
111. The chief advantage of the cost-minimization approach is that it helps to assure con-
sideration of the various different goals of the system and their interrelationship. However, 
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in other contexts we have been told that we must live with constitu-
tional arrangements that are inefficient. 112 Individual dignity, effectu-
ation, and participation compete with efficient administration at every 
turn. 113 They also compete with judicial power. 
IV. THE FLIGHT FROM LAW 
The ultimate cost of complexity is surrender of the ideal of justice 
under law. At a time when so few civil cases are resolved by trial114 
and when there is growing interest in diverting cases from the courts, 
it is a pity that Complex Litigation treats alternative dispute resolution 
as an add-on (pp. 814-40). The material on encouraging settlement 
(pp. 683-91) does not redress the balance, both because it is so abbrevi-
ated and because its location in the book hinders a coherent view of 
the flight from law. 11s 
In a recent article, Professor Galanter identified "two recurrent 
themes that impel and justify involvement in the settlement pro-
the approach is of little help if the definition of costs is itself incomplete or vague. The 
specific interrelationships of goals are wholly obscured if all non-administrative goals are 
lumped together as one. 
Bush, supra note 17, at 930. 
112. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
[I]t is not clear that the utilitarian balancing analysis asks the constitutionally relevant ques-
tions. The due process clause is one of those Bill of Rights protections meant to insure 
individual liberty in the face of contrary collective action. Therefore, a collective legislative 
or administrative decision about procedure, one arguably reflecting the intensity of the con-
tending social values and representing an optimum position from the contemporary social 
perspective, cannot answer the constitutional question of whether due process has been 
accorded. 
Mashaw, supra note 19, at 48-49, excerpted in R. CoVER & 0. F1ss, supra note 15, at 21. 
113. See note 37 supra and accompanying text. 
114. The rate of settlements remains high. The great majority of civil cases are settled. 
The portion of cases that run the whole course of possible contest has continued a long 
historical decline. In the federal courts, cases reaching trial have fallen from 15.2% ofter-
minations in 1940 to 5.0% of terminations in 1985. In state courts, too, a smaller portion of 
cases is decided by full contest than in the past. 
Galanter, Litigation Explosion, supra note 24, at 8 (footnotes omitted). 
For caution about equating terminations or dispositions with settlement, see Kritzer, Adjudi-
cation to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161 (1986). 
115. Reforming procedural incentives to promote just settlements requires a fundamental 
change in the way that we view civil procedure. Before such changes can be made, we will 
have to stop thinking of the "pretrial" process as a prelude to trial, and start thinking of it as 
the "main event" - as the matrix of incentives within which the overwhelming majority of 
cases are going to be settled by two party-appointed arbitrators (the opposing lawyers). The 
most pervasive "ADR" system in the United States today is probably pretrial procedure 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ..•. 
Elliott, supra note 29, at 335-36. 
Before taking Professor Elliott's advice, however, one should decide whether, as a normative 
matter, procedure should be crafted so as to encourage settlement - in all cases or in some 
subset of cases. See text accompanying notes 116-27 infra. Moreover, that question should be 
addressed in the context of considering a variety of dispute resolution processes. See Bush, supra 
note 17, at 905-07; Rhode, supra note 24, at 286-88; text accompanying notes 125-30 infra. Fi-
nally, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designed to "encourage" settlement 
may raise questions of political legitimacy. See text accompanying notes 64-71 supra; Burbank, 
supra note 57. 
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cess,"116 which he called the "warm" theme and the "cool" theme. 
He defined them as follows: 
The "warm" theme refers to the impulse to replace adversary conflict by 
a process of conciliation to bring the parties into a mutual accord that 
expresses and produces community among them. The "cool" theme em-
phasizes not a more admirable process but efficient institutional manage-
ment: clearing dockets, reducing delay, eliminating expense, un-
burdening the courts.117 
The authors of Complex Litigation include in their materials op. 
settlement an excerpt from a speech by Judge Tone that plays both 
themes. 118 To Tone, settlement is in most cases more likely to lead to 
optimal justice than adjudication, and aggressive participation by the 
judge is necessary "in order to manage a burgeoning caseload" (p. 
684). Unfortunately, the authors do not force students to confront an 
opposing view. 119 Certainly, the federal statistics on cases that actu-
ally come to trial suggest that if a substantial portion of filed cases 
were not settled the system would collapse.120 In that respect the set-
tlement of civil cases is like plea bargaining in criminal cases. Profes-
sor Fiss has argued that the analogy carries further: 
Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining: Consent is 
often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; 
the absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involve-
ment troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be 
done. Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions 
of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised.121 
It may be that advocates of settlement like Judge Tone and oppo-
nents like Professor Fiss are talking past each other. Tone speaks of 
cases in which the amount of money is small in relation to the antici-
pated cost of litigation or in which nonmonetary relief is the plaintiff's 
central objective and it is less painful for the defendant to give that 
relief than to bear the expense of additional litigation (p. 685). Fiss is 
concerned mainly with structural public law litigation.122 But even if 
they are talking past each other, that very perception should cause one 
to question whether a trans-substantive solution makes sense.123 
116. Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 
257, 257 (1986). 
117. Id. For a recent example of the "warm" theme, see McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconcili-
ation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985). But see Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985). 
118. Tone, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, in SEMINARS FOR NEWLY AP· 
POINTED UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 57, 58-60, 61-66 (1975), excerpted at pp. 683-87. 
119. The authors do, however, alert teachers to such a view. See TEACHERS MANUAL, supra 
note 3, at 208-09. This material should be in the book. 
120. See note 114 supra. 
121. Fiss,Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). But see Alschuler, supra note 
24, at 1820-31 (arguing that settlement can be problematic, but for different reasons). 
122. See Fiss, supra note 121, passim. 
123. See Burbank, supra note 57. The 1984 proposed amendment to rule 68 exempted only 
class and derivative actions. Id. at 429 n.20. 
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Moreover, Tone's second category surely includes some of the cases 
that are Fiss' special concern, and the problems that Fiss and others 
identify are by no means confined to such cases.124 
In any event, the debate about settlement should be placed in the 
context of a more general debate about modes of dispute resolution. A 
central question in that debate should be whether courts exist primar-
ily or exclusively to resolve disputes or whether, in addition, they exist 
to perform functions one or more of which would, in certain cases, be 
put at risk by settlement, arbitration, mediation, mini-trials, rent-a-
judge, or some other alternative to litigation.125 To what extent are 
proposals to reform the adjudicatory process (or to divert cases from 
the courts) likely to rob that process of its distinctive attributes? Pro-
fessor Piss puts it this way: 
Many of the factors that lead a society to bring social relationships that 
otherwise seem wholly private (e.g., marriage) within the jurisdiction of 
a court, such as imbalances of power or the interests of third parties, are 
also likely to make settlement problematic. Settlement is a poor substi-
tute for judgement; it is an even poorer substitute for the withdrawal of 
jurisdiction. 
. . . Civil litigation is an institutional arrangement for using state 
power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals. 126 
There is a good deal of force in this argument, but it misses an 
important point. To the extent that equity has gobbled up law, the 
pressure on parties to settle cases may correspondingly increase.127 
Moreover, in such a world, the attractiveness of Professor Fiss' ideal 
may depend on the confidence one reposes in judges. And with all the 
talk about judicial power in this essay, one might well ask why key 
124. In fact, it is argued, because of their frequency, consumer disputes (and perhaps other 
types of small claims) involve large potentials for activity costs in the aggregate; therefore 
despite the small amounts at stake in individual cases, an adjudicatory process is called for 
- rule-oriented, and resource-allocation-based - to minimize these very significant costs. 
Bush, supra note 17, at 967-68. See also Fiss, supra note 121, at 1087-89. 
125. See note 63 supra. See also Sarokin, supra note 83, at 433, 437-38. 
126. Fiss, supra note 121, at 1088-89. See also Galanter, Litigation Explosion, supra note 24, 
at 38-39; Alschuler, supra note 24, at 1816-17; Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness 
and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. 
REV. 1359. 
127. For the role of uncertainty in the settlement of the Agent Orange litigation, see Schuck, 
supra note SO, at 346, 352-53. As indicated there, the proposition in the text is contrary to that 
suggested by certain economic models. See also Alschuler, supra note 24, at 1825-28 & n.85. 
Professor Bush has noted that "adjudication is only theoretically rule-oriented or preceden-
tial; in operation, it is often impossible to predict decisions or awards based on previous cases." 
Bush, supra note 17, at 943. Moreover, in connection with the view that the availability of 
adjudication affects settlement, see Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979), Professor Bush observed: "For this to 
occur, however, the 'shadow of the law,' i.e., the possibility of moving into rule-based adjudica-
tion, must be real and not fictional." Bush, supra note 17, at 979 n.173. See also Subrin, supra 
note 7, at 989 ("bargaining ... in the shadow of a shadow"); Alschuler, supra note 24, at 1823 
n.64. 
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members of the federal judiciary have jumped on the ADR band-
wagon.128 In doing so, are they not repudiating power? 
As Professor Subrin has suggested, the alternatives in current fash-
ion represent a logical terminus in the progression from law in the 
sense that Justice Harlan described it, through equity, to dispute reso-
lution simpliciter. 129 It is also true - and perhaps an explanation suf-
ficient in itself- that judges are not lacking for business; indeed, they 
are tormented by statisticians interested only in case dispositions. Do 
Federal judges may recognize, in other words, that power is a feeble 
instrument if there is no time to exercise it. When we recognize, how-
ever, that pre-trial and not trial is the scene of the action in federal 
courts, a somewhat different explanation is suggested, one that may 
shed additional light on recently proposed amendments to rule 68. 131 
Professor Galanter has suggested that the federal judiciary's view 
of the role of pre-trial procedure in effecting settlement has changed 
over time.132 Professor Resnik has suggested that the current view is 
problematic at least in terms of a historical/ideal model of adjudica-
tion.133 For present purposes, the important point is that with few 
civil cases being tried in federal court, ADR is fertile ground for the 
exercise of power: power to "influence" settlement, 134 to establish the 
rules and procedures for court-annexed arbitration and other alterna-
tives to adjudication, 135 and indeed, conceivably, to structure a dispute 
resolution system of the sort described by Professor Sander. 136 At the 
least, this perspective gives added bite to a distinction between ADR 
128. See, e.g., Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 1984 Year-End Report on the Judiciary 15-16 
(copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). Cf Rhode, supra note 24, at 283-84 ("What is, 
however, distinctive about the current climate is the intensity of support for alternative dispute 
resolution within powerful public, private, and professional constituencies."). 
129. See Subrin, supra note 7, at 987-91. But see Bush, supra note 17, at 973-87 (arguing that 
the comparative advantage of adjudication over other modes of dispute resolution in terms of 
formal values is not as great as is usually assumed). 
130. See, e.g., Enslen, Should Judges Manage Their Own Caseloads?, 70 JUDICATURE 200, 
201 (1987). 
131. See generally Burbank, supra note 57. 
132. See Galanter, supra note 116. See also Galanter, ·~ •. A Settlement Judge, not a Trial 
Judge:" Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12 J.L. & SocY. 1 (1985). 
133. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 388-90, 401-02, 406, 425-31 
(1982). See also Alschuler, supra note 24, at 1835-36; text accompanying note 87 supra. But see 
Flanders, Blind Umpires - A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 510-14 
(1984). 
134. See text accompanying note 50 supra; Sarokin, supra note 83, at 434-36. Cf Galanter, 
supra note 116, at 262 (active judicial participation in settlement may "be a response to a shift in 
the character of common law adjudication"). 
135. See generally Levin & Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District Courts, 
37 U. FLA. L. REV. 29 (1985). But see Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Proce-
dure: Federal Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. 
REV. 537, 544-45 (1985). 
136. See Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPEC-
TIVES ON JUSTICE JN THE FUTURE 65 (A.L. Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 1979). 
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modes that are court-annexed and those that take place outside the 
courts. Perhaps now we can explain procedural reformers' seemingly 
schizophrenic reaction to arbitration.137 
* * * 
Professors Marcus and Sherman have rendered a service to the 
profession. Complex Litigation is not only an excellent course book; it 
is a highly useful reference work. The book has appeared at a time 
when it is most needed. The federal rulemakers are considering a 
comprehensive reexamination of the Federal Rules. 138 The American 
Law Institute is pursuing three inquiries that will necessarily include 
consideration of problems of complex litigation.139 Legislative reform 
proposals have been introduced,140 and more are sure to follow. 
In the past, the nature of procedural study and scholarship was 
such that few lawyers or scholars would have been equipped to con-
tribute to the reform debate that is now brewing.141 From that per-
spective, Complex Litigation represents a major contribution to 
knowledge. The challenge for the law reformer is not to get carried 
away: not to let one set of practical problems characteristic of com-
plex litigation preclude attention to others, 142 not to let images of com-
plex litigation preclude attention to litigation that is not complex, 143 
not to let practical problems preclude attention to process values other 
than efficient administration, 144 and not to consider process values in 
the vacuum of trial or pre-trial procedure.145 
137. See Burbank, supra note 57, at 427. See also Bush, supra note 17, at 1001-02 (discussing 
process biases that may arise from self-interest and professional socialization); Merry, Disputing 
Without Culture (Book Review), 100 HARV. L. REv. 2057, 2069-71 (1987) (criticizing the ADR 
movement for presuming an "indifferent state"). Cf. Rhode, supra note 24, at 276 ("Much re-
formist rhetoric has a curiously schizophrenic tone."); Trubek, Turning Away from Law? (Book 
Review), 82 MICH. L. REv. 824, 827 (1984) (exploring "current paradoxes in elite rhetoric"). 
138. See note 78 supra. 
139. For the Institute's Study Project on Complex Litigation, see notes 106-07 supra. The 
Institute is also conducting a "Project on Compensation and Liability for Product and Process 
Injuries," which includes consideration of "various alternative procedures for resolving claims 
and controversies, including jury and court trials, administrative rulemaking and adjudication, 
optional or mandatory arbitration, and other systems of dispute resolution." AM. LAW. INST., 
1986 ANNUAL REPORT 15, 17. Finally, the Institute has embarked on a study of the litigation 
process. See New Restatement Projects and Study of Litigation Process Planned, 8 A.L.I. REP., 
July 1986, at 1. 
140. See, e.g., H.R. 4315, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1986); H.R. 3690, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 4 (1983); Rowe & Sibley, supra note 106, at 9-10. 
141. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra. 
142. See text accompanying notes 13 & 103-09 supra. 
143. See text accompanying notes 11-12, and text following note 30 supra. 
144. See text accompanying notes 15-41 & 110-13 supra. 
145. See note 15 supra; text accompanying notes 114-37 supra. 
